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ABSTRACT
In recent years, a large number of disputes have arisen in which
parties invoke the First Amendment, but the government action they
challenge does not directly regulate “speech,” as in communication.
Instead, the government is restricting the creation of communicative
materials that are intended to be disseminated in the future—in
other words, they restrict producing speech. Examples of such
disputes include bans on recording public officials in public places,
Los Angeles County’s ban on bareback (condom-less) pornography,
restrictions on tattoo parlors, so-called “Ag-Gag” laws forbidding
making records of agricultural operations, as well as many others.
The question this Article addresses is whether such laws pose serious
First Amendment problems.
I conclude that they do. Two distinct reasons justify First Amend-
ment protection for conduct associated with producing speech: first,
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because such protection is necessary to make protection for communi-
cation meaningful; and second, because the Press Clause provides a
textual and historical basis for such protection. However, because
speech production involves conduct that can have substantial, neg-
ative social consequences, First Amendment protection of speech
production must be limited, and is probably less extensive than pro-
tection of actual communication.
In the balance of this Article, I propose a doctrinal framework for
how restrictions on speech production might be analyzed. The
framework draws on broader free speech principles such as the
content-based/content-neutral dichotomy, and the Supreme Court’s
repeated statements that the First Amendment accords special
importance to speech relevant to the democratic process. However, the
framework is distinct from general free speech analysis, and for the
reasons discussed above, is generally more tolerant of regulation. I
close by applying my proposed doctrinal rules to a number of recent
disputes.
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INTRODUCTION
“Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press.”1 These are the words of the Speech and Press Claus-
es of the First Amendment, and they have been recognized since at
least the mid-twentieth century as protecting some of the most im-
portant rights granted by the Constitution.2 But what exactly do
these words refer to? Presumably the answer is oral and written
communication, the former being protected by the Speech Clause,
and the latter by the Press Clause.3 Of course, in modern times
there are many more forms of communication than oral speech and
writing, and the Supreme Court has freely extended First Amend-
ment protections to such technologies as video games4 and the In-
ternet.5 In so doing, as numerous commentators point out, the Court
has not in modern times distinguished between the Speech and
Press Clauses.6 It has rather used the Speech Clause as the primary
source of protection, treating the Press Clause as “a superfluous
subset of the Speech Clause.”7 In short, under current law, the
Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment protect commun-
ications in any and all forms, primarily though the Speech Clause.8
The Court’s focus on the Speech Clause, however, has obscured
some important differences between various forms of communica-
tion.9 The paradigmatic communication protected by the Speech
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (stating that the freedoms of
speech and press, as well as religion, occupy a “preferred position”); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944) (same); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (same).
3. See Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information:
Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249,
250 (2004).
4. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
5. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
6. McDonald, supra note 3, at 258 & n.29.
7. Id. (citing David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430, 449-50
(2002)); see also 3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 22:6
(2014).
8. The precise contours of the protection provided may depend on the medium of expres-
sion. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637, 657 (1994) (recognizing that the
Court has treated different communications media differently for First Amendment purposes).
9. This is not the only area where the modern Court’s myopic focus on speech has caused
it to lose sight of important historical and doctrinal principles. See Ashutosh Bhagwat,
2015] PRODUCING SPEECH 1033
Clause is in-person, oral communication.10 Indeed, when the states
ratified the First Amendment in 1791, this was of course the only
form of oral communication and thus the only thing protected by the
Speech Clause (assuming that the Press Clause protected written
communication).11 Pure, oral speech, however, has a distinct charac-
teristic in that it is “created” simultaneously with its dissemination.
The speaker makes noise, and the noise is heard at the same time.12
The same is true for in-person, symbolic conduct. The “speaker”
burns a draft card13 or a flag,14 and the audience instantaneously
receives the message.15 Critically, however, this characteristic does
not hold for many other forms of communication. Rather, there is a
time lag, sometimes a substantial one, between creating the mes-
sage and its dissemination to its intended audience. Thus, a book is
printed, but may not be distributed or read until much later. A
movie is filmed, but probably will not be screened for several
months, if not years. A photograph is taken, but may not be printed
or posted to the Internet or shown to others for some time. Indeed,
because books are reread over the years and movies are rescreened,
the time lag between production and communication can be very
significant, even centuries.
The existence of this time lag has an important implication. It
means that a meaningful distinction can be drawn between the act
of creating, of producing communication, and the act of actually
communicating. The act of producing a communication—all of which
the modern Court designates “speech” because of its focus on the
Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 985-94 (2011) (discussing how the Court’s jurispru-
dence has been distorted by its dependence on the Speech Clause, rather than the Assembly
Clause, to protect a right of association).
10. See McDonald, supra note 3, at 250.
11. This raises the difficult question of whether, and if so how, the First Amendment pro-
tected nonprinted written communications, such as handwritten letters. See id. The text of
the Amendment would appear to give no protection to such letters, though such a result seems
hard to justify in any principled way. Thankfully, however, the resolution of that question is
beyond the scope of this Article.
12. Technically, I suppose, a time lapse exists between the speech and its reception
because noise moves at the speed of sound, not instantaneously. But obviously, for in-person
speech, that time lag is infinitesimal.
13. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
14. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
15. Or more accurately, the audience receives the message at the speed of light, even
faster than sound.
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Speech Clause16—can take many forms and involve many different
steps. The question that obviously arises is whether, and if so to
what extent, the First Amendment protects the antecedent act of
producing speech, not just the eventual communication. Does a
prohibition on openly recording public conversations between police
officers and members of the public without the consent of both
participants violate the First Amendment?17 What about a ban on
tattoo parlors?18 A ban on making pornographic movies unless the
actors wear condoms?19 What about a tax on paper and ink used in
publications?20 More broadly, does the First Amendment protect a
right to gather information, if that information is needed to produce,
say, a news story?21 In each of these situations, we are faced with a
law that does not directly prohibit or regulate an act of communica-
tion, but makes it difficult or impossible to create the message to be
distributed. As we shall see, courts are deeply divided, and even
more deeply confused, about whether and when the First Amend-
ment protects such conduct.22
Interestingly, despite the foundational nature of this question, it
has received remarkably little scholarly attention. The most exten-
sive recent discussion of these issues is in Seth Kreimer’s article
about image capture.23 There is also an extensive literature about
news gathering that touches upon this problem.24 Indeed, there is
16. This broader definition of speech as encompassing all communication can be contrast-
ed to the historical meaning of speech as limited to oral, in-person communication.
17. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down such a
statute); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011) (denying qualified immunity to police
officers who arrested a citizen for filming them).
18. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010) (striking down
such a ban).
19. See Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 113 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (rejecting First
Amendment challenge to Los Angeles’s “Measure B,” which imposes such a condom
requirement).
20. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)
(striking down a tax on paper and ink used in production of publications as violating the Press
Clause).
21. See, e.g., Steven Helle, The News-Gathering/Publication Dichotomy and Government
Expression, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1; McDonald, supra note 3.
22. See infra Part I.
23. Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory,
Disclosure, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (2011).
24. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Right to Map (and Avoid Being Mapped): Recon-
ceiving First Amendment Protection for Information-Gathering in the Age of Google Earth, 14
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even a burgeoning literature on protection for “bareback” (condom-
less) pornography.25 However, all of this scholarship focuses on First
Amendment protections for one particular form of conduct involved
in producing speech, rather than on the broader questions of wheth-
er and why the First Amendment should be understood to protect
all forms of conduct associated with producing speech. Those are
questions this Article addresses.
My conclusion is that the First Amendment should be read to
provide some protection for producing speech, but that the protec-
tions cannot and should not be absolute, or even as strong as the
protections accorded to actual communication. The theoretical
reason to protect speech production is that failure to do so would
largely denude protection for communications. Moreover, there is a
logical historical and textual source for such protections: the Press
Clause. The Press Clause protects technology—in 1791 the printing
press, today of course many other things as well—used to produce
communications intended for later mass dissemination. On the
other hand, the reason that protection for producing speech must be
limited is because producing speech can involve a wide range of
conduct that can cause social harm entirely independent of the
communicative impact of the eventual speech. Therefore, although
rules for protecting speech production can draw upon free speech
doctrine, they cannot import the doctrine wholesale. Instead, courts
need to develop a more nuanced jurisprudence.
Part I summarizes a number of recent disputes, all of which raise
the question of whether restrictions on producing speech implicate
the First Amendment. Part II presents a theoretical framework for
why conduct associated with producing speech should receive First
Amendment protection. Part III begins to sketch out some limiting
principles and doctrinal formulations regarding how courts should
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 115, 120-21 (2012); Steven Helle, Reconsidering the Gather-
ing/Publication Dichotomy: Recording as Speech? What Next?, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 537, 537-
38 (2013); Helle, supra note 21, at 2-3; McDonald, supra note 3, at 254; Diane L. Zimmerman,
Overcoming Future Shock: Estes Revisited, or a Modest Proposal for the Constitutional
Protection of the News-Gathering Process, 1980 DUKE L.J. 641, 642-43.
25. See generally Alexander S. Birkhold, Poking Holes in L.A.’s New Condom Requirement:
Pornography, Barebacking, and Speech, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1819 (2013); Christopher A.
Ramos, Note, Wrapped in Ambiguity: Assessing the Expressiveness of Bareback Pornography,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1839 (2013).
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analyze regulations of conduct related to the production of speech.
Finally, Part IV applies my proposed test to some of the cases and
conflicts discussed in Part I.
I. REGULATION OF SPEECH PRODUCTION
In recent years, a number of lawsuits and other disputes have
arisen in which parties invoked the First Amendment, but in fact,
the challenged government action did not directly restrict an act of
communication.26 Instead, the restriction was on antecedent conduct
necessary to produce a desired communication.27 Courts have strug-
gled with these cases and often resolved them in contradictory ways.
However, on the whole, neither courts nor commentators have seen
these disputes as related to each other or as posing a common, over-
arching problem. Rather, courts have treated each fact pattern as
raising a distinct issue. I begin with an overview of some of these
disputes in order to illustrate how and why courts have struggled
with these cases and also to point to their underlying commonalities.
A. Taxing Ink and Paper
The foundational case in this area is undoubtedly the Supreme
Court’s 1983 decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minne-
sota Commissioner of Revenue.28 The case involved a challenge to
Minnesota’s tax laws.29 Minnesota exempted periodic publications
from its general sales tax.30 To compensate, however, it imposed a
“ ‘use tax’ on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in the
production of a publication.”31 Furthermore, the tax exempted small-
er publications.32 As a result, only eleven publishers in the state
paid the tax, and the Star Tribune, the plaintiff, paid two-thirds of
the total amount collected.33 The Supreme Court struck down the
26. See McDonald, supra note 3, at 258-59.
27. See id. at 259.
28. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
29. Id. at 575.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 577.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 578.
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tax, holding that because the use tax “singled out the press,” the
State bore “a heavier burden of justification” with respect to gener-
ally applicable regulations.34 The Court concluded that Minnesota
could not carry this burden because taxes singling out the press
posed the risk of retaliation against unpopular speakers, and the
State could not explain why its revenue needs could not be satisfied
by a generally applicable tax.35 Finally, the Court held that because
the tax’s exemption for smaller publications “target[ed] a small
group of newspapers,” it “present[ed] such a potential for abuse that
no interest suggested by Minnesota c[ould] justify the scheme.”36
The Court’s analysis in Minneapolis Star & Tribune is revealing,
but frustrating. Early on in its discussion, the Court recognized that
one of the distinct features of the use tax at issue was that “it taxes
an intermediate transaction rather than the ultimate retail sale,”
yet the majority assigned no constitutional significance to this fact.37
Instead, the nature of the use tax was treated as relevant only
because it was not a normal use tax designed to prevent evasion of
a sales tax—as there was no sales tax here to evade.38 It should be
obvious, however, that a tax on ink and paper is not a direct tax on
communication as is a sales tax on a newspaper sale. Instead, such 
a tax financially burdens the publisher’s ability to create the news-
paper, to produce communication. Another interesting point is that
even though the plaintiffs here invoked only the Press Clause and
not the Speech Clause, the Court never suggested that this matter-
ed.39 Instead, the Court discussed in general terms whether the use
tax violated “the First Amendment.”40 In short, Minneapolis Star &
Tribune simply presumed, without analysis, that the First Amend-
ment protects activities associated with producing speech, in con-
trast to actually disseminating it. It also failed to consider whether
the Speech and Press Clauses might play different roles in such
cases.
34. Id. at 583.
35. Id. at 586-90.
36. Id. at 591-92.
37. Id. at 581.
38. See id. at 582.
39. See id. at 579. The plaintiffs also invoked the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, but the Court did not consider this claim. Id.
40. Id. at 582-83, 591-93.
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B. Recording Public Officials
In recent years, one of the most controversial and heavily
litigated set of speech-production disputes involves laws preventing
citizens from making audiovisual recordings of public officials—
usually police officers—engaged in their official duties in public
places.41 Although there have been a number of decisions on this
point, the most prominent is the Seventh Circuit’s carefully con-
sidered opinion in American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Illinois
v. Alvarez.42
The Illinois eavesdropping statute prohibits audio recording any
conversation unless all parties to the conversation consent and,
unlike most such statutes, covers even conversations in public pla-
ces that are openly recorded.43 The ACLU challenged the law as
applied to a proposed ACLU program to openly audio and video
record police officers engaged in their duties in public places and
speaking at audible volumes.44 The district court dismissed the suit
on the grounds that “the First Amendment does not protect ‘a right
to audio record,’ ” and that “the police officers and civilians who
would be recorded were not ‘willing speakers.’ ”45 On appeal, the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed and enjoined application of the Illinois statute
to the ACLU program.46 The court’s First Amendment analysis
began by flatly asserting that “[a]udio and audiovisual recording are
media of expression commonly used for the preservation and dis-
semination of information and ideas and thus are [protected by the
First Amendment].”47 Unlike in Minneapolis Star & Tribune, howev-
er, the Alvarez court appreciated the complexity of the issue it faced,
because the Illinois law prohibited only the making of recordings,
41. See Jesse Harlan Alderman, Before You Press Record: Unanswered Questions Sur-
rounding the First Amendment Right to Film Public Police Activity, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 485,
489-90 (2013) (stating that “untold hundreds—or thousands—of citizens have been arrested
for” recording the police in public).
42. 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
43. Id. at 595 & n.4.
44. Id. at 588.
45. Id. at 589 (quoting ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, No. 10 C 5235, 2011 WL 66030, at *3-4
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2011)).
46. See id. at 584.
47. Id. at 595.
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not their dissemination.48 In a crucial passage the court concluded
that the First Amendment was still implicated:
The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is
necessarily included within the First Amendment’s guarantee of
speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate
the resulting recording. The right to publish or broadcast an
audio or audiovisual recording would be insecure, or largely
ineffective, if the antecedent act of making the recording is
wholly unprotected, as the State’s Attorney insists. By way of a
simple analogy, banning photography or note-taking at a public
event would raise serious First Amendment concerns; a law of
that sort would obviously affect the right to publish the resulting
photograph or disseminate a report derived from the notes. The
same is true of a ban on audio and audiovisual recording.49
The court then quoted heavily from an earlier Ninth Circuit
opinion that struck down a ban on tattoo parlors to reemphasize
this point, arguing:
The process of expression through a medium has never been
thought so distinct from the expression itself that we could
disaggregate Picasso from his brushes and canvas, or that we
could value Beethoven without the benefit of strings and
woodwinds. In other words, we have never seriously questioned
that the processes of writing words down on paper, painting a
picture, and playing an instrument are purely expressive
activities entitled to full First Amendment protection.50
Finally, and critically, the court concluded that the Illinois eaves-
dropping statute could not be sustained as a generally applicable
statute because it “specifically targets a communication technology”
and the law “directly” burdened First Amendment rights by “direct-
ly” regulating “the expressive element of an expressive activity.”51
The Seventh Circuit’s Alvarez decision is notable for recognizing
the distinction between regulations of communication and regula-
48. See id.
49. Id. at 595-96.
50. Id. at 596 (quoting Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir.
2010)).
51. Id. at 602-03.
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tions restricting the production of communication, and also for
forthrightly holding that the First Amendment’s protections extend
to producing speech.52 However, the opinion is not without its
problems. First of all, the court extended First Amendment protec-
tions to speech production without fully explaining why, and with-
out explaining whether protection extends to all conduct associated
with the production of speech or merely some. In particular, by
emphasizing the fact that this case involved producing speech
regarding public officials, a category of speech receiving especially
strong First Amendment protections,53 the court raised doubts about
protections for other kinds of recordings and other speech-producing
conduct. However, the First Amendment does not only protect
speech about public officials, making one wonder why that might be
so. Second, and more critically, the court’s analysis of incidental
versus direct regulations is fatally flawed. The court concluded that
because the law restricts “a communication technology,” here the
use of an audio recorder, it necessarily targets an “expressive
activity.”54 This assumes that a law targeted at recording conversa-
tions necessarily targets the production of speech. That is not true.
After all, a peeping tom or a stalker might make a recording of
private or public conduct, without having any intention of later
disseminating it. Speech requires an audience, so that is not
“producing speech.” In short, the Alvarez court’s analysis demon-
strates a far higher level of sophistication than the Supreme Court
or, as we shall see, other lower courts; but it does not adequately
resolve all of the hard issues.
The decision in Alvarez built on a fairly extensive line of cases
dealing with recording police officers and other public officials. The
most important precedent prior to Alvarez was the First Circuit’s
decision in Glik v. Cunniffe.55 Police arrested Glik for using his cell
phone to video record police officers arresting another young man on
the Boston Common.56 Glik was not charged, but brought a civil
rights action against the arresting officers.57 The First Circuit
52. See id. at 595-96.
53. See id. at 597-98.
54. Id. at 602-03.
55. 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
56. Id. at 79.
57. Id. at 80.
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rejected the defendants’ qualified immunity defense, concluding that
the First Amendment protects the “filming of government officials
engaged in their duties in a public place, including police officers
performing their responsibilities,”58 and that this right was “clearly
established” at the time of Glik’s arrest.59 On the crucial issue of
whether First Amendment protections stretch beyond communica-
tion to filming, the court concluded that “the First Amendment’s
aegis extends further than the text’s proscription on laws ‘abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press,’ and encompasses a range of
conduct related to the gathering and dissemination of informa-
tion.”60 Thus, like the Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit explicitly
granted First Amendment protections beyond speech to antecedent
conduct, such as “gathering ... information.” Unfortunately, the
court did so with an even more cursory analysis.61 Notably, in
establishing a right to gather information, the court cited various
Supreme Court opinions that are completely off point62 or that
rejected First Amendment claims.63 Thus as with Alvarez, the Glik
decision unambiguously recognized a right to record police officers
as an aspect of producing speech, but left unclear both the basis for
and the contours of that right.
Other decisions in this area have also found that the First
Amendment protects recording public officials, but with even less
analysis than in Glik. For example, in Smith v. City of Cumming, a
case cited in Glik,64 the Eleventh Circuit flatly asserted that the
First Amendment protects a right “to photograph or videotape police
conduct” as an aspect of “the right to gather information about what
public officials do on public property,” but then found, without
explanation, that the right had not been violated in that case.65
58. Id. at 82.
59. Id. at 85.
60. Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (striking down ban on
corporate campaign expenditures); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (finding First
Amendment right to possess obscene materials in the privacy of one’s home)).
63. Id. (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (rejecting claim that press
have First Amendment right to photograph a jail and interview prisoners)).
64. Id. at 83.
65. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). “Our recognition that
the First Amendment protects the filming of government officials in public spaces accords
with the decisions of numerous circuit and district courts.” Glik, 655 F.3d at 83.
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Similarly, in Blackston v. Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit held
that plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights were potentially violated
when the presiding officer refused to allow them to tape record a
public meeting of the Alabama Supreme Court Advisory Committee
on Child Support Guidelines.66 The court, however, failed to
recognize that a restriction on recording did not directly burden
speech, holding instead that recording was “expressive conduct
protected by the Free Speech Clause.”67 This is clearly incorrect. The
act of recording is not itself expressive in the way that burning a
flag is expressive because it does not communicate a message; it
creates a message to be communicated later. Thus once again, the
court unambiguously extended protection to speech production, but
without a coherent explanation.
Finally, and most recently, in People v. Clark, the Illinois Su-
preme Court struck down on overbreadth grounds the same eaves-
dropping statute partially enjoined in Alvarez.68 Clark was indicted
for recording a hallway conversation with the opposing attorney, as
well as a conversation between himself, the same attorney, and a
judge during the course of a child custody hearing, all without the
consent of the other participants.69 On the crucial question of
whether recording conversations was activity protected by the First
Amendment, the court simply asserted:
[R]ecordings are medias of expression commonly used for the
preservation and dissemination of information and ideas and
thus are included within the free speech and free press guaran-
tees of the first and fourteenth amendments. The act of making
such a recording is necessarily included in the first amendment’s
guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right
to disseminate the resulting recording.70
There is thus a substantial body of case law granting First
Amendment protections to the recording of public officials in public
places, albeit (with the important exception of the Seventh Circuit)
66. 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
67. Id.
68. 6 N.E.3d 154 (Ill. 2014).
69. Id. at 156-57.
70. Id. at 159 (citing ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012)) (citation
omitted).
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based on fairly cursory analysis. It is important to note, however,
that the cases are far from unanimous on providing protection. Most
notably, in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, the Third Circuit dismissed
a civil rights action brought by an individual who was arrested for
recording a traffic stop by a police officer while a passenger in the
stopped car on qualified immunity grounds.71 Although acknowledg-
ing the existence of precedent such as Smith, the court concluded
that other cases raised doubts about the existence and scope of a
right to record police officers, and that in any event, none of the
earlier cases “involved traffic stops, which the Supreme Court has
recognized as inherently dangerous situations.”72
One of the other cases the Kelly court relied on was Whiteland
Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland.73 There, the Third
Circuit upheld a ban on videotaping planning commission meetings,
concluding that the recording ban did not “interfere[ ] with ...
expressive activity,” but rather only restricted the “right to receive
and record information.”74 Because the plaintiffs were able to attend
the meeting and record the information in other ways, such as by
taking notes or making an audio recording, the video recording ban
did not interfere with that right.75 The court entirely ignored the
fact that the ban effectively eliminated plaintiff ’s ability to create
a distinctive form of speech.
Finally, the Kelly court also cited S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks
Serving Summit County.76 S.H.A.R.K. was an animal rights group
that wished to record a planned deer culling by placing cameras on
the ground and attaching them to trees in a public park.77 Park
officials removed the cameras, and S.H.A.R.K. sued.78 The court
began its analysis by emphasizing that “[t]he case before us is about
access to information as opposed to the right to expression,” and
therefore traditional free speech doctrine did not apply.79 For such
cases, the court held, the key question is whether the government
71. 622 F.3d 248, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2010).
72. Id. at 262.
73. 193 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1999).
74. Id. at 183.
75. Id. at 183-84.
76. 499 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2007).
77. Id. at 557-58. The park was closed during the culling, for obvious reasons. Id.
78. Id. at 558-59.
79. Id. at 559.
1044 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1029
is selectively limiting access—“if the rule does not selectively delimit
the audience, we uphold the restriction if it is reasonably related to
the government’s interest; if the rule does selectively delimit the
audience, a stricter level of scrutiny will apply.”80 On the facts, the
court concluded that the removal of cameras was justified based on
the government’s interests in protecting trees, and in establishing
a uniform method of treating found property, neither of which was
selective.81
What do these cases, taken together, suggest? First, the Third
Circuit notwithstanding, it seems clear that most appellate courts
have recognized some First Amendment right to record public
officials, albeit the courts are unclear if the right is derivative of the
right to speak or is an aspect of an independent right to gather
information. Second, however, it is also clear that courts that have
considered the issue agree that the right, if it exists, is subject to
restrictions. What remains unclear is what sorts of restrictions are
permissible, and what sorts are not.
C. Bareback Pornography
In November of 2012, voters in Los Angeles County approved
Measure B, the “County of Los Angeles Safer Sex in the Adult Film
Industry Act.”82 The Measure regulates the adult film industry in a
number of ways, including banning the filming of anal or vaginal
intercourse without use of a condom.83 In other words, Measure B
bans the production of so-called “bareback,” or condom-less,
pornography.84 Soon after Measure B was passed, Vivid Entertain-
ment, a major porn producer, filed a lawsuit challenging Measure
B under the First Amendment.85 The official defendants in the case,
county health officials, declined to defend Measure B, so the District
Court permitted the official proponents of Measure B to intervene
and defend it.86 On the key issue, for our purposes, of whether the
80. Id. at 561.
81. Id. at 562-63.
82. See Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 2013);
Birkhold, supra note 25, at 1819; Ramos, supra note 25, at 1840 & n.4.
83. See Ramos, supra note 25, at 1840.
84. Id.
85. Vivid Entm’t, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 1121-22.
86. Id.
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condom requirement violated the First Amendment, the court
reached a split decision. It denied defendants’ motion to dismiss,
concluding that the condom rule was a restriction on “expressive
conduct,” which targeted the “secondary effects” of the speech at
issue, and therefore was subject to intermediate scrutiny.87 Conclud-
ing that plaintiffs had at least alleged sufficient facts to suggest
Measure B might not pass such scrutiny, the court refused to
dismiss the First Amendment claim.88 However, later in the same
opinion, the court denied plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary
injunction, concluding that the First Amendment challenge to the
condom requirement was unlikely to succeed on the merits because
the law advanced the government’s interest in preventing the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), and the govern-
ment’s evidence suggested that Measure B was narrowly tailored to
do so.89 However, the court did grant plaintiffs a preliminary
injunction against certain other aspects of Measure B.90
The error in the court’s analysis in Vivid Entertainment should by
now be clear. Measure B’s condom requirement is not a regulation
of expressive conduct because it regulates filming, an act of
producing speech, not disseminating it. If the Measure was directed
at a live sex show, that would be an expressive-conduct regulation,
but it is not. Interestingly, the limited commentary on this subject
repeats the court’s error. Alexander Birkhold describes Measure B
as a regulation of the “manner of speech rather than the specific
subject matter or message conveyed by the speech,”91 though he con-
cludes that Measure B cannot survive intermediate scrutiny.92 In
contrast, Christopher Ramos concludes that Measure B is content-
based, but he nonetheless repeats the error of treating Measure B
as targeting either “protected speech” or “expressive conduct.”93 Both
descriptions are of course incorrect, also making suspect Ramos’s
87. Id. at 1125.
88. Id. at 1126-27.
89. Id. at 1135.
90. Id. at 1136. Interestingly, under Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2652-53
(2013), insofar as the proponents lost at the trial court level, they presumably lack standing
to appeal.
91. Birkhold, supra note 25, at 1823.
92. Id. at 1825.
93. See Ramos, supra note 25, at 1843, 1860-64, 1868.
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assumption that if Measure B is content-based, it automatically
triggers strict scrutiny.94
The regulation of bareback pornography has thus created the
same analytic difficulties, and mistakes, as other regulations of 
speech production, such as taxes on ink and paper and bans on
filming public officials. To my knowledge, no commentator has con-
nected these factually disparate areas of jurisprudence, but as this
discussion indicates, there seems to be little doubt that they are
logically linked.
D. Tattooing
One cutting edge question that has arisen in a number of recent
cases is the extent to which the First Amendment protects the busi-
ness of running a tattoo parlor.95 In recent years, both the Ninth
Circuit96 and the Arizona Supreme Court97 have unequivocally con-
cluded that a tattoo is undoubtedly a form of expression, fully
protected by the First Amendment. Furthermore, despite authority
to the contrary,98 this must be correct. A tattoo is a visual symbol, a
combination of pictures and words. There is no question that the
First Amendment protects pictures, such as paintings or photo-
graphs, and also protects words regardless of their content—unless
they fall into some unprotected category, such as obscenity.99 It is
also well established that such protections do not depend on the
medium used to convey those pictures and words, whether it be
print,100 video tapes,101 words taped onto a denim jacket,102 or video
games.103 Given these well-accepted principles, the fact that the
medium used in tattoos—indelible ink inserted into skin104—is a bit
94. See id. at 1870. I will explore the difficult question of whether Measure B is best un-
derstood as a direct, content-based, or incidental restriction on producing speech in Part III.
95. See, e.g., Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863, 869 (Ariz. 2012) (discussing the
division of authority on this subject).
96. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1051-52, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2010).
97. Coleman, 284 P.3d at 869-70.
98. See id. at 869 (citing cases rejecting full First Amendment protection for tattooing).
99. See McDonald, supra note 3, at 258-59.
100. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
102. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
103. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
104. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2010)
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unconventional is surely no barrier to protection. Thus, if someone
were to be arrested for wearing a tattoo criticizing President
Obama, that is as clearly a First Amendment violation as an arrest
for publishing a book critical of the President. Tattoos are obviously
speech.
What about the act of creating a tattoo, and also the business of
running a tattoo parlor? The Ninth Circuit in the Anderson decision
explicitly addressed this question, and in language picked up by the
Seventh Circuit in Alvarez and quoted above,105 rejected “a distinc-
tion between the process of creating a form of pure speech (such as
writing or painting) and the product of these processes (the essay or
the artwork) in terms of the First Amendment protection afford-
ed.”106 As such, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the act of tattooing
was entitled to “full First Amendment protection,” as was the
business of tattooing.107 In Coleman v. City of Mesa, the Arizona
Supreme Court adopted the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in its entirety,
similarly holding that denying a business permit to a tattoo parlor
raised serious First Amendment issues.108 In the course of doing so,
the Arizona court rejected earlier decisions that had concluded that
the act of tattooing was not sufficiently expressive to qualify as pro-
tected expressive conduct, concluding to the contrary that tattooing
is “pure speech.”109
These conclusions seem clear and unequivocal in extending full
constitutional protection to the act and business of tattooing. They
are, however, problematic because the act of creating a tattoo is not
itself an act of communication; rather, it is an act of creating future
communication, which is “spoken” when an audience eventually
views the tattoo.110 To say that the creation of a tattoo is intrinsi-
(describing modern tattooing techniques).
105. See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 2012); supra text accompany-
ing note 50.
106. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1061.
107. Id. at 1062-63.
108. 284 P.3d 863, 869-72 (Ariz. 2012).
109. Id. at 869-70 (discussing Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago, 580 F. Supp.
2d 656, 659-60 (N.D. Ill. 2008), and Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1253 (D. Minn.
1980)).
110. See Clay Calvert, Fringes of Free Expression: Testing the Meaning of “Speech” amid
Shifting Cultural Mores & Changing Technologies, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 545, 565-66
(2013) (recognizing that the Anderson and Coleman courts rejected a “process-versus-product
dichotomy” that other courts have embraced).
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cally bound up in the eventual act of communication is of course
true—the latter is impossible without the former. But tattooing
itself is nonetheless not communication, it is conduct. As such, it can
raise regulatory issues—primarily health concerns, as with bare-
back pornography111—that are unrelated to the communicative im-
pact of the message, and that may be far more serious than concerns
raised by prototypical “pure speech.” The Anderson and Coleman
courts’ flat assertion that tattooing receives the same level of
protection as communication, therefore, at the least requires some
greater discussion and justification than either court provided.
E. Ag-Gag
In 2012, the Utah legislature passed H.B. 187, titled “Agricultural
Operation Interference.”112 The Act prohibits individuals from: (a)
leaving a recording device at an agricultural operation without the
owner’s consent; (b) gaining access to an agricultural operation
under false pretenses; (c) obtaining employment at an agricultural
operation with the intent of recording agricultural operations with-
out the owner’s consent; and (d) recording an agricultural operation
without the owner’s consent while committing criminal trespass.113
The purpose of the statute is presumably to prevent animal rights
activists from obtaining compromising recordings of the treatment
of animals in agricultural facilities. The Utah bill resembles, and
expands upon, a similar bill passed by the Iowa legislature in
2011.114 Although neither of these bills, commonly called “Ag-gag”
laws, has (to my knowledge) been challenged yet, laws such as these
are certainly controversial and are of serious concern to animal
rights organizations.115 Some sort of legal challenge seems likely,
especially if prosecutions are brought under these laws.
111. See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1056 (discussing health risks associated with tattooing).
112. H.B. 187, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012), available at http://perma.cc/DAC9-BLE3. 
113. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (West 2012).
114. H. File 589, 84th Leg. Gen. Assemb., Gen. Sess. (Iowa 2012), available at http://perma.
cc/BVM2-YRMZ.
115. See, e.g., Anti-Whistleblower Bills Hide Factory-Farming Abuses from the Public,
HUMANE SOC’Y (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/campaigns/factory_
farming/fact-sheets/ag_gag.html#id=album-185&num=content-3312 [http://perma.cc/6BVX-
KEK3]. 
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Do they pose a serious First Amendment problem? The answer,
of course, is that it is not clear. Except for the prohibition on gaining
employment through false pretenses, the Utah law directly prohibits
recording specific content. It does not, however, prohibit speaking
on a particular issue, or even disseminating recordings legally ob-
tained, for example from off the property. The law is thus a restraint
not on expression, but on the production of specific expression.
However, it is clear that the purpose and effect of the statute is to
prevent speech. After all, the harm these recordings threaten is to
the reputations of agricultural operations, which can only occur if
the recordings are made available to the public. Indeed, given the
nature of the recordings, it is hard to imagine any other reason to
make them other than for public distribution. “Ag-gag” laws are a
quintessential example of a restriction on producing speech of
specific content, without directly restricting speech itself.
F. Photography
Although most of the litigation regarding recording has involved
audiovisual recording of public officials, the same basic concerns are
raised by any restrictions on recordings, including on photography.
Of course, such restrictions are rare except at sensitive places, such
as military facilities, where presumably any applicable standard of
review can be satisfied. But two recent controversies demonstrate
that the problem exists.
One of those controversies is the topic of a recent article by Marc
Jonathan Blitz: the constitutionality of potential restrictions on
Google’s ability to take images for use in Google Maps and Google
Earth.116 As Blitz notes, Google has already been subject to legal
restrictions on its ability to capture needed images in other coun-
tries.117 In the United States, there is an ongoing dispute over
whether restrictions, or civil liability, should be imposed on Google
in the name of privacy.118 Blitz recognizes that Google’s image
capture is not itself speech, but only the collection of information
needed to produce speech.119 However, citing the Alvarez and Glik
116. Blitz, supra note 24.
117. See id. at 188 & n.13.
118. Id. at 118-19.
119. Id. at 121.
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cases striking down restrictions on filming public officials, Blitz
argues that the First Amendment should be interpreted to provide
some form of “constitutional protection for those seeking to explore
and record their environment,” at least insofar as the information
gathered is going to be used to produce communications on a matter
of public interest, such as a map.120 Blitz then develops this argu-
ment further by citing Griswold v. Connecticut for the proposition
that constitutional protections go beyond “primary” rights to also
protect the “peripheral rights” needed to give that primary right
meaningful effect.121 In short, Blitz’s arguments for protection of im-
age capture needed for mapmaking largely parallel and build upon
earlier judicial and scholarly arguments for extending protections
to such activities as filming public officials, bareback pornography,
and tattooing.
The question of constitutional protections for photography also
arose in a different but related context in Elane Photography v.
Willock.122 The issue in that case was whether New Mexico could,
consistent with the First Amendment, apply its antidiscrimination
laws to impose liability on a professional wedding photographer who
refused to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony.123 As our
discussion of Google’s image-capture indicates, there seems little
doubt that photography is, in general, a means of producing speech,
because photographs displayed to an audience clearly constitute
protected communication. Unlike the other disputes we have dis-
cussed, however, Elane Photography did not involve a prohibition on
producing speech. It involved the state compelling an unwilling
individual to produce speech. This, however, does not mean that the
First Amendment is not implicated because, in the context of pure
speech regulations, the First Amendment has long been read to
protect individuals from being forced to articulate a message of the
government’s choosing.124 Ultimately, the New Mexico Supreme
120. Id. at 144-46.
121. Id. at 154-55 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965)). In
Griswold, the Court held that the Constitution protected a right of privacy of married couples
to use contraceptives. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
122. 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
123. Id. at 59-60.
124. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that individuals may not
be fined for covering up the New Hampshire state motto “Live Free or Die” on their auto-
mobile license plate); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (ruling that
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Court rejected Elane Photography’s constitutional claim on the
grounds that application of state antidiscrimination law did not
compel Elane Photography to speak; it only required that “if Elane
Photography operates a business as a public accommodation, it
cannot discriminate against potential clients based on their sexual
orientation.”125 Similarly, the court rejected the argument that New
Mexico was controlling the content of Elane Photography’s expres-
sion, concluding that all it was doing was controlling the identity of
the firm’s clients.126 Finally, the court suggested that Elane Photogra-
phy’s claim was distinguishable from successful compelled-speech
claims because the application of New Mexico antidiscrimination
law to it did not even require Elane Photography to speak to the
public, but only express a message to its clients.127
It is worth taking some time to consider the New Mexico Supreme
Court’s reasoning. First of all, the last argument seems clearly
incorrect. The argument that Elane Photography’s compelled speech
was directed only at clients, not the public, seems factually wrong
because presumably the pictures will eventually be displayed to
others. In any event, the recipient is legally irrelevant because the
U.S. Supreme Court has clearly held that the First Amendment
protects private speech between individuals.128 The other argu-
ments, while not as obviously incorrect, are also somewhat suspect.
The New Mexico court drew a sharp distinction between compelling
speech, or determining the content of speech, and the selection of
clients.129 This distinction would make perfect sense if Elane
Photography was in the business of renting barware for weddings.
But as applied to a business whose sole function is to create speech,
the distinction is suspect. Elane Photography is, after all, hired to
photograph its clients. The identity of the clients is entirely deter-
minative of the content of the resultant photography. Presumably,
a statute requiring a photographer to create photographs of same-
sex weddings would raise serious constitutional concerns. But to
public school students may not be compelled to recite the Pledge of Allegiance).
125. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 64.
126. Id. at 66-68.
127. Id. at 68.
128. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 386-78, 387 n.11 (1987) (citing Givhan v. W. Line
Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414-16 (1979)).
129. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 66-68.
1052 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1029
require Elane Photography to serve same-sex couples is indistin-
guishable from requiring it to photograph same-sex weddings—the
two are inextricably interconnected. This is not to say that the
court’s ultimate conclusion is incorrect. As we shall see, it can be
argued that the New Mexico statute is constitutional because it is
not specifically directed at speech (it is not because it would apply
on the same terms to a hypothetical barware provider).130 But the
issue is a hard one, and the New Mexico Supreme Court’s analysis
on the point is inadequate.
G. The Right to Gather Information
One final issue worthy of some attention in this Part is the extent
to which the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment
should be read to protect some sort of a broader right to gather
information needed to produce news. There is an extensive scholarly
literature arguing in favor of such a right, on the grounds that
without it, the press cannot effectively perform its constitutional
functions of informing the public and acting as a watchdog over
government.131 The Supreme Court, however, has flatly rejected
such a general right in every single case in which it has been
argued.132 It is quite obvious, and the Court has never denied, that
gathering information is an essential precondition of the media’s
ability to create news for the public. In other words, information
gathering is necessary to produce speech. Thus, there is clearly—as
the commentary argues—a nontrivial argument that the First
Amendment should accord some protection to such activities. Why,
then, has the Court been so consistently hostile to such claims?
130. See infra notes 226-35 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 3, at 347-48 (2004); Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the
First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1127-28 (1999);
Zimmerman, supra note 24, at 655-56.
132. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (rejecting journalist’s claim to have
access to prison inmate); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (same); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (same); cf. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991)
(finding that the First Amendment does not relieve the media from complying with generally
applicable laws, even if the laws impede their ability to gather news). The Court has, however,
recognized a narrow right of access to judicial proceedings. See Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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One basic and perhaps insoluble problem here relates to the
identity of the rights-holders. Most claims to a right to gather
information have been rooted in the Press Clause, and have been
described as a right of the “press”—that is, the institutional press.
The reason for this, of course, is the sense that if all members of the
public had such a right, the burdens on the government would be
unmanageable.133 This argument, however, is entirely incompatible
with the fact that the Supreme Court has never read the Press
Clause to provide any special protections to the institutional press
or any other specific group of speakers. To the contrary, the Court
has always and explicitly rejected such a position.134 Moreover, the
most careful extant academic examination of this question agrees
that both historically and in modern times, the dominant under-
standing of the Press Clause has been that it protects a particular
technology (the printing press) rather than a particular group of
speakers (the institutional press).135 Finally, it should be obvious
that even if there had been an argument, either a historical one
(unlikely) or an instrumental one (perhaps more defensible), to
grant the institutional press special privileges during the twentieth
century, under modern circumstances, that argument has collapsed.
In the age of the Internet, in which blogs, websites, social media,
and the like allow every one of us to communicate with broad audi-
ences, and in which increasingly large numbers of citizens obtain
their information and ideas from nontraditional sources, the distinc-
tion between a favored “institutional press” and other speakers is
simply not plausible. If the First Amendment protects an informa-
tion-gathering right, it must be for all potential speakers, not a
select few.136
133. See McDonald, supra note 3, at 268, 349-50.
134. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010); id. at 390 n.6 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797-801 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-05 (1972); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444, 452 (1938); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937).
135. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology?
From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2012); see also David A. Anderson, Free-
dom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 446-47 (2002); Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering
Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 429-46 (2013).
136. Barry McDonald has argued that information-gathering rights should be restricted
to persons who have “membership in a group or organization whose recognized function was
to obtain information for the purpose of public dissemination.” McDonald, supra note 3, at
349-50. Even though this formulation extends protection beyond journalists to others such as
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Another source of difficulty in this area is that a right to gather
information is even more distantly related to actual speech than the
other forms of speech production we have discussed. The other ex-
amples all involve regulations that impede the actual production of
communicative materials, whether it be a newspaper, pornographic
film, tattoo, photograph, or an audiovisual recording. Gathering
information is conduct that occurs even earlier in the chain of
events that eventually results in speech, in that it predates the
creation of the message. Instead, information gathering produces
the content that makes the creation of speech possible.137 Once the
First Amendment’s protections are extended beyond actual produc-
tion of speech, however, the question that arises is how far back in
the chain of causation will protection stretch. Presumably, a law
regulating logging will not raise constitutional problems even
though less logging almost certainly will raise the price of paper, no
less so than the tax struck down in Minneapolis Star & Tribune.
But when in the chain of events between the logging and the actual
selling of a newspaper do First Amendment protections kick in? No
obvious answer emerges.
In short, there are good arguments that the First Amendment
should provide some protection to conduct associated with the pro-
duction of speech, if free speech protections themselves are to be
meaningful. On the other hand, extending protections to speech pro-
duction raises difficult questions regarding why the First Amend-
ment protects anything other than acts of communication, as well
as regarding the kinds of speech-producing conduct deserving of
protection and the extent of that protection. It is to those questions
that we now turn.
II. PENUMBRAL RIGHTS AND THE PRESS CLAUSE
In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas famously wrote that
“specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
academics and researchers, it still begs the question of why professional speakers should be
favored under the First Amendment over the general public.
137. Barry McDonald acknowledges this point, though he continues to support a limited
right to gather information. Id. at 268.
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substance.”138 Admittedly, the Griswold Court’s conclusion that one
of those penumbral rights was “marital privacy” to use contracep-
tives is rather questionable, as the asserted right has no close
relationship to any textual right.139 Nonetheless, there is more than
a grain of truth in Justice Douglas’s assertion—the Court undoubt-
edly has regularly recognized that a constitutional provision is best
understood to protect conduct beyond what the bare text would
require, if that protection is necessary to effectuate the textual
right. In particular, in the context of the First Amendment, the
Court has long protected a right to expend money in order to
purchase the means to disseminate speech,140 as well as the right to
sell and profit from the sale of books.141 More generally, as Seth
Kreimer points out, the Court has regularly extended protection to
conduct associated with the distribution of speech such as “handing
out leaflets that may end up as litter, placing newsracks on public
property, or distributing books to stores.”142 Moreover, Robert Post
is surely correct that the First Amendment would not permit a state
to “prohibit the use of projectors without a license.”143
All of these examples involve restrictions on the distribution of
speech, in which the connection between the regulated conduct and
speech is both extremely close and obvious. The Court has also pro-
tected conduct preceding speech, that is, conduct related to the
production of speech. An example of such protection that we have al-
ready discussed is the Court’s conclusion in Minneapolis Star &
Tribune that a tax on ink and paper used by publishers violated the
138. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
139. It is noteworthy that in later cases the Court located the right of privacy in the Due
Process Clause rather than in penumbras of the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
140. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
251-52 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 19 (1976) (per curiam); Kreimer, supra note 23, at 382.
141. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991);
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
142. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 65 n.6 (1963); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-27 (2001) (finding
that delivery of an audio tape constitutes “pure speech” because, like the delivery of a handbill
or pamphlet, it communicates a message); Kreimer, supra note 23, at 384 & nn.170-71, 387
n.182 (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 762-72 (1988)).
143. Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 713, 717 (2000).
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First Amendment.144 Presumably, a special tax on celluloid film
would also have raised serious First Amendment issues, when that
film was necessary for photography. Another prominent example of
penumbral protections for conduct related to the production of
speech can be found in the Court’s “expressive association” jurispru-
dence. In a series of cases extending back to the Civil Rights Era,
the Court recognized that as a corollary to its explicit protections,
the First Amendment also protects an implicit right to associate
with others for expressive purposes.145 The protected act of associa-
tion need not be itself expressive. In the leading case on this subject,
the Court protected the right to maintain anonymous membership
in a civil rights organization because of the attendant risk of retal-
iation, even though the act of anonymous membership is not itself
expressive.146 The First Amendment protects association because it
is a necessary precondition of speech.147
There is thus doctrinal and logical support in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence for the proposition that the First Amendment
extends some protection to conduct associated with the production
of speech. The Press Clause of the First Amendment provides a text-
ual foundation for such protection.148 As discussed earlier, the dom-
inant historical and modern understandings of the Press Clause is
that the Clause protects the technology of the printing press, not
certain favored speakers, such as the institutional press.149 It should
be noted, however, that regulation or licensing of printing presses
does not impact actual communications. It rather constrains the pro-
duction of a printed item (for example, a leaflet or a newspaper)
which, when distributed to the public, will communicate thoughts
144. See 460 U.S. 575 (1983); supra Part I.A; see also Kreimer, supra note 23, at 384 &
n.172.
145. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
146. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461-62.
147. See Kreimer, supra note 23, at 385.
148. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom ... of the
press.”).
149. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. It is also well understood that at the
time of the Framing, the archetypal (though probably not the only) form of regulation that
would violate the Press Clause was a prior restraint on the press, in the form of licensing. See
David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 495 (1983).
However, as the Minneapolis Star & Tribune case among others demonstrated, the modern
understanding is no longer so narrow.
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and ideas. Regulation of the press is thus regulation of the produc-
tion of communication rather than of communication itself, and so
the Press Clause by its terms protects the production of written
speech.
It might not, however, protect all speech-producing acts. The
printing press is a means to produce speech for broad distribution.
Indeed, at the time of the Framing,150 the printing press was the
only technology available for the mass dissemination of messages.151
There is no particular reason to think that the Press Clause would
have been understood at the time of the Framing to extend to the
production of other forms of speech such as oil paintings or hand-
written letters. It does, however, seem eminently sensible, if the
Press Clause is to have any meaning in the modern, electronic
world, that its protections must be extended to all modern technolo-
gies that create messages for mass dissemination.152 In other words,
the press today is not just a printing press, but also a television
studio or a reporter’s camera. This seemingly innocuous insight,
however, has profound implications in the era of the Internet and
social media. In our time, many citizens speak instantaneously to
audiences larger than those available to the average colonial
printer. In the age of Youtube, Facebook, and Twitter, we are all
publishers of mass communications. This in turn means that while
the Press Clause may not originally have protected the speech-
productive conduct of most speakers, today it does, at least with
respect to the production of digital speech intended for electronic
dissemination. If I record a photograph or video on my cell phone
intending to post it to Facebook, that act of recording is no less the
creation of mass speech than is the printing of a paper copy of the
New York Times (or for that matter the posting of an electronic copy
to the Times’s website). The Press Clause should be understood to
provide some degree of protection for all of these acts.
150. The same holds true in 1868, when the technology of speech remained much the same.
The year 1868 is of course relevant because it is the date of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification, and the First Amendment applies to the states only through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
151. See Volokh, supra note 135, at 462 n.10 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 800 n.5 (1978) (Burger, J., concurring)).
152. See id. at 462-63.
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Finally, it should be noted that even if the Press Clause does not,
by its terms, protect the creation of “private” speech—speech
intended for limited audiences—that does not necessarily mean
such conduct receives no protection. As just noted, the Court has
long interpreted the Speech Clause to extend penumbral protection
to conduct closely associated with speech, notably distribution of
speech but also some speech-preceding conduct. Furthermore, there
seems no reason not to read the Press Clause to also provide some
penumbral protections. Indeed, this is arguably what the Court did
in Minneapolis Star & Tribune, albeit by implication. In combina-
tion, it seems clear that these penumbral protections should provide
some degree of protection for some conduct associated with the
production of even private speech.
At the same time, however, it seems unlikely that all conduct
related in any way to the production of speech can be protected—
remember the example of regulating logging153—nor can protection
be absolute, any more than protection for speech itself.154 Further-
more, given the penumbral nature of the protection of speech pro-
duction, and the fact that the production of speech entails conduct
that can cause social harms entirely independent from any commu-
nicative impact, the protections for speech-production should argu-
ably be less rigorous than protections for actual communication.
III. REGULATING SPEECH PRODUCTION
As the above discussion suggests, it seems clear that the First
Amendment protects not only literal acts of communication but also
penumbral conduct associated with the distribution and production
of speech. Protection of distribution appears to be coextensive with
protection of speech itself, and is uncontroversial. Production,
however, raises more complex problems. For one thing, it has long
been clear that the press is not immune from generally applicable
regulations of conduct.155 This is in contradistinction to speech—the
153. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
154. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (upholding a
content-based restriction on political speech on national security grounds); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding content-neutral restriction on the speech of
cable providers).
155. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (promissory estoppel claims);
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extant doctrine at least purports to subject generally applicable reg-
ulations of conduct that incidentally impinge on expression to a
moderately rigorous level of scrutiny.156 Why then is speech produc-
tion treated differently?
One source of the difficulty lies in the fact that there are no clear
boundaries delineating the scope of conduct related to the produc-
tion of speech. The distribution of speech is typically a straightfor-
ward, time-limited event. That is not so in the chain of events that
eventually produces speech. The physical act of producing speech
may be time limited, but many preceding steps are necessary before
actual production can commence. Most notably, as discussed earlier,
the process of gathering information is necessary to many forms of
speech, even though it predates the actual writing/recording of
speech.157 And indeed, necessary steps go further back, including
logging trees to produce paper, or quarrying sand to produce the
silicon needed to manufacture the modern memory chips used for
digital photography. It seems facially implausible that the First
Amendment would provide substantial protection to all of this
conduct, nor is it clear that penumbral protections are entirely
missing for conduct prior to the actual, physical production of
speech. After all, a ban on the importation, production, or sale of
memory chips would be a pretty effective means to suppress digital
photography, just as restrictions on ink could destroy print publish-
ing.
Moreover, even if one chose to limit protection to acts of produc-
tion, the level of protection that should be accorded is unclear. The
difficulty lies in the fact that the production of speech is itself
conduct, which can cause social harm. When the main forms of
speech production were publishing and writing (and oral speaking),
the risk of noncommunicative harms was obviously limited. Today,
however, speech production covers conduct ranging from making
audio and visual recordings to photography, tattooing, or having sex
before a camera. All of these forms of conduct can cause social harm.
Some of those harms, such as the health risks associated with
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (antitrust laws); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (labor laws).
156. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Univ. City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,
273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001).
157. See supra Part I.G.
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tattooing or making bareback pornography, have no link whatsoever
to communicative impact. In other situations, the nature of the
harm is more complex. Thus, in the cases involving recording of
police officers in the course of their duties,158 one potential social
harm is that the actions of the recording citizen might physically
interfere with the officers’ ability to conduct a safe arrest, a harm
completely unassociated with communicative impact. On the other
hand, another concern expressed by police is that knowing that their
actions are being recorded may cause officers or other public officials
to avoid taking necessary risks.159 This is a harm tied to the
communicative impact of the recording, as it is only if the recording
is likely to be shared with the public that officers’ conduct is likely
to be deterred. Finally, some social harms are directly linked to
communicative impact. Consider, for example, privacy concerns and
national security concerns, both of which are common justifications
for restricting photography or recordings. Both harms, however,
occur only from, and as a direct consequence of, the communication
of the speech. Privacy is lost and national security is threatened
when an unintended audience receives private or secret informa-
tion, not when the information is recorded. This is evidenced by the
fact that individuals record themselves in intimate settings and the
government records secret information all the time. Yet despite the
fact that these harms are related to communicative impact, they are
nonetheless real and legitimate, and the government surely has
some power to protect against them. The question that obviously
arises, then, is how to reconcile protection for speech production
with such legitimate social interests.
At least part of the answer emerges from the Press Clause
jurisprudence regarding generally applicable laws. As noted earlier,
the Court has long held that members of the press have no immu-
nity from generally applicable regulations of conduct.160 Indeed, this
result would appear to be necessitated by the fact that the Press
Clause protects not a particular industry, but rather a specific set
158. See supra Part I.B.
159. For example, this was the concern underlying the restriction on recording upheld in
S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit County, 499 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2007). See supra
notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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of technologies.161 Moreover, even if exemptions from general laws
for publishers were plausible in earlier times, in today’s world,
where we are all potential mass publishers, such exemptions are
obviously impossible. The doctrinal implication of this insight, how-
ever, is clear: generally applicable regulations of conduct that inci-
dentally burden conduct associated with the production of speech
are subject to no constitutional scrutiny beyond the default and
highly deferential rational basis standard applicable to all regula-
tions restricting liberty.162 This approach grants less protection for
speech production than for speech, but that is probably appropriate
given the fact that speech-producing conduct is broader in range,
and far more likely to be associated with noncommunicative harms,
than speech itself.163
What then of laws which are not generally applicable, but which
rather target speech-producing conduct? Within this category, there
is a further distinction to be drawn between laws that target speech
production on a content-neutral basis and laws that restrict the pro-
duction of speech because of its specific content. Examples of laws
falling into the former, content-neutral category include laws re-
stricting filming or recording in particular places or at particular
times, eavesdropping statutes like the Illinois statute struck down
in Alvarez,164 bans on tattooing (probably),165 and the tax on ink and
paper struck down in Minneapolis Star & Tribune.166 Other laws,
however, are best understood not just to regulate the production
of speech, but to impose restrictions based on the content of the
speech to be produced. One example of such content-based laws is
161. See Volokh, supra note 135, at 508-09 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-
05 (1972)).
162. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc. 438 U.S. 59, 82-84 (1978);
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1955).
163. The primary authority for the position that the institutional press does receive special
exemptions from at least some generally applicable laws would appear to be Justice Powell’s
concurring opinion in Branzburg. See Volokh, supra note 135, at 508-09 (citing Branzburg,
408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring)), and lower court decisions relying on Powell to
create a newsgathering privilege. Id. at 523-25. As Eugene Volokh points out, however, almost
all lower courts have extended this privilege of newsgathering to all potential speakers to a
mass audience. Id. And again, in the world of Facebook it is hard to see how this distinction
can be maintained any longer.
164. See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
165. See infra Part IV.D.
166. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
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a provision in the Illinois eavesdropping statute that imposes a
penalty enhancement when a prohibited recording is of a police
officer, prosecutor, or judge.167 Los Angeles’s Measure B, prohibiting
bareback pornography, is also a content-based restriction on speech
production. It is a restriction on speech production (as opposed to a
generally applicable law) because it does not ban all sex without
condoms, but only sex without condoms on film.168 Measure B is
content-based because it only prohibits the creation of speech with
that specific content.
It is of course familiar grounds in First Amendment jurisprudence
that content-based laws are of greater constitutional concern than
content-neutral laws. For restrictions on speech itself, the doctrine
imposes strict scrutiny on content-based laws169 and a relatively def-
erential form of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral laws.170 It
is tempting to conclude that the same rules should be extended to
regulations of speech production: strict scrutiny for content-based
restrictions, intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral ones. Indeed,
that appears to be precisely what many of the lower court decisions
discussed in Part I did.171 The analogy between content-based regu-
lations of speech and content-based regulations of speech-producing
conduct, however, is imperfect. When governments regulate or sup-
press speech based on content, the reason is typically because the
message conveyed by the speech is believed to cause some sort of
social harm—that is, the harm to be prevented is linked to the
communicative impact of the speech. Thus, when the government
seeks to ban flag burning, it is because of the harm caused by the
message sent by flag burning;172 and when the government regulated
sexually oriented cable television channels, it was because the
167. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 604 n.11.
168. Of course, a general ban on sex without condoms would almost certainly violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending Griswold
to unmarried individuals); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a
Connecticut law banning the use of contraceptives, as applied to a married couple); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (finding that a law requiring particular recidivist felons to
be sterilized violated the Equal Protection Clause).
169. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
170. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
171. See, e.g., Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 605; Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051,
1064 (9th Cir. 2010); Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 119, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
172. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989).
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content of the channels was believed to harm children.173 In con-
trast, in one set of cases in which the Court concluded that facially
content-based statutes—zoning regulations of adult busi-
nesses—were not directed at harms associated with communicative
impact, the Court declined to impose strict scrutiny under the
“secondary effects” doctrine.174 What this suggests is that strict
scrutiny generally applies to content-based laws because the Court
is highly suspicious of the proposition that particular messages can
cause social harm.
As illustrated by Los Angeles’s Measure B, the difficulty is that
the same presumption does not extend to regulations of speech
production. Measure B is undoubtedly content-based, for reasons
discussed above; but the harm it is directed at is the spread of STDs,
which has no relation to the communicative impact of pornographic
films.175 Watching pornography cannot give you an STD. Similarly,
at least one of the potential harms motivating restrictions on
recording police officers—concerns about physical risk in inherently
dangerous situations—has no relationship to the communicative
impact of the recording. For that reason, it is not clear that the
strong presumption of unconstitutionality associated with strict
scrutiny is appropriate for these sorts of laws.176 Instead, in these
cases, the conclusion that a law targets the production of specific
content is probably best considered as the first step. The second step
is to then determine whether the government can make a strong,
plausible case that the harm it is combatting is unrelated to the
message or communicative impact. Absent that showing, that is,
only if the reviewing court is convinced that the regulation targets
173. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813-14 (2000).
174. See City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (2002); City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, 475 U.S. 1 (1986). Admittedly, the logic of the “secondary effects” is questionable
because it seems likely that the crime and blight associated with adult businesses is drawn
to them precisely due to the pornographic nature of the materials they sell. But at least for
now, the Court does not appear to have abandoned the test, even though in Alameda Books
five justices questioned its validity. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 448 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (describing secondary effects doctrine as a “fiction”); id. at 457 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(questioning secondary effects doctrine as well).
175. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
176. The only instance that I am aware of when a majority of the Supreme Court upheld
a restriction on speech under strict scrutiny is Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.
Ct. 2705 (2010), and that case involved national security. Cf. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191
(1992) (plurality opinion) (finding strict scrutiny satisfied in free speech case).
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communicative impact, is strict scrutiny appropriate.177 If the
government’s regulatory interest is truly unrelated to communica-
tive impact, then some form of intermediate scrutiny may well
suffice. However, it is important that such scrutiny not be exces-
sively deferential to the government. Particular attention should be
paid to whether the effect of the law is to completely eliminate
particular content, as opposed to merely limit its creation.
Finally, what about laws that target speech production, but in a
truly content-neutral manner? Such laws do not impede the creation
of any particular message or content, but do restrict speech
production, and so presumably these laws must be subject to some
scrutiny. At the same time, such laws are ubiquitous and often
advance very important social interests. Thus, properly tailored
eavesdropping statutes, which require consent before recording
private conversations, and wiretapping statutes protect important
privacy interests. Restrictions on tattooing can protect the public
health. And time, place, and manner restrictions on, for example,
filming movies, can protect against traffic disruption.
The Supreme Court and lower courts have long assumed the con-
stitutionality of at least some such laws. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the
Court presumed the constitutionality of a statute forbidding wire-
tapping,178 even though it subsequently held that the broadcasting
of an illegally wiretapped conversation by a third party uninvolved
in the original wiretap was protected by the First Amendment, at
least as long as the topic of the conversation was “a matter of public
concern.”179 Similarly, in Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, al-
though the Ninth Circuit struck down a flat ban on tattoo parlors,
it presumed the constitutionality of imposing health regulations on
tattoo parlors, even if such regulations increased the cost of running
such businesses.180 These assumptions have strong reasons behind
them. The creation of speech is a form of conduct that can produce
a wide variety of social harms that the government can legitimately
regulate. Moreover, such regulations are ubiquitous. It seems un-
likely that every regulation impinging on speech creation, from
177. This approach has obvious parallels to the “secondary effects” doctrine, but does not
share the weaknesses of that test.
178. 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001).
179. Id. at 535 (Breyer, J. concurring).
180. 621 F.3d 1051, 1065-68 (9th Cir. 2010).
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health regulations of tattoo parlors to safety regulations imposed on
film crews, are presumptively unconstitutional. Clearly, any reason-
able constitutional regime must give governments some space to
regulate conduct associated with speech production.
At the same time, a highly deferential standard for all such rules
is also problematic because it permits the elimination of highly
socially valuable speech. For example, if content-neutral rules were
subject only to rational basis review, cases like Alvarez and Glik
would come out the other way, which is quite troublesome. The
question then becomes: How does one protect valuable speech with-
out hamstringing legitimate regulation?
The court’s analysis in Alvarez may point the way. Recall that the
question in Alvarez was the constitutionality of the Illinois eaves-
dropping statute, as applied to openly recording police officers in
public.181 The court did not strike down the statute on its face, but
only as applied to the ACLU’s program to record police officers,
because of the very high value the First Amendment accords to
speech about how government officials perform their duties—a
value rooted in the crucial role of the First Amendment in fostering
democratic self-governance.182 The parallels here to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bartnicki are obvious. In both cases, the First
Amendment protections were extended not to all speech, but only
speech relevant to democratic self-government, or as the Supreme
Court put it, “about a matter of public concern.”183
I propose that this approach should be extended to content-
neutral regulations of speech production. Such regulations are
presumptively constitutional on their face, but may be challenged
as applied to speech that contributes in some substantial way to
democratic self-governance.184 It should be emphasized that restric-
ting protection to speech on matters of public concern, or relevant
181. See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012).
182. Id. at 599-601.
183. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215-16 (2011).
184. Elsewhere, I have explored in greater detail how a court might determine whether
speech makes such a contribution, and why the Supreme Court’s current formulation of the
“matter of public concern” test fails to do so adequately. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific
Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 50-53 (2012); see also Robert Post,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 164-69 (1995). A detailed
consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but could largely build on that
earlier analysis.
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to democratic self-governance, is not a general First Amendment
principle—indeed, the Court has explicitly rejected such a limita-
tion.185 However, we are dealing here with laws regulating not
speech, but speech production, itself a penumbral right, and doing
so in content-neutral terms, thereby reducing the risk of censorship.
In that context, limiting serious First Amendment scrutiny to
speech at the core of the First Amendment’s purposes seems a
reasonable means to balance free speech values against other legiti-
mate social goals, just as the Court has done in other contexts.186
Finally, even if the speech to be produced lies at the “core” of First
Amendment values, laws regulating speech production can some-
times be enforced if the government’s interest is strong enough. In
that situation, however, searching judicial scrutiny is certainly
required, under which a reviewing court ensures that the govern-
ment has a strong regulatory interest, that the interest would be
undermined if the speech-creation at issue was granted an exemp-
tion, and that the strength of the regulatory interest outweighs the
burden on speech. Such an approach seems to properly balance
society’s interest in producing and receiving valuable speech against
legitimate regulatory interests unrelated to expression.
IV. APPLYING THE TEST
I close by briefly considering how the analysis proposed in the
previous part would apply to some of the disputes described in Part
I. As we shall see, even under the unified approach proposed here,
some difficult questions remain. But on the whole, my framework
introduces a much-needed level of coherence and consistency in re-
solving closely related disputes.
185. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 479-80 (2010); Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
186. See, e.g., Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215-16 (considering speech inflicting emotional dis-
tress); Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534 (illegally intercepted information); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 534 (1989) (private facts); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (libel).
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A. Taxing Ink and Paper
The first case discussed in Part I was the tax on ink and paper
struck down by the Supreme Court in Minneapolis Star & Tri-
bune.187 The Minnesota tax was clearly targeted at speech produc-
tion, both because the only possible use of ink and paper is to
produce speech, and more specifically because the tax was imposed
only on ink and paper used by publications. However, it is equally
clear that the tax was content-neutral, because it did not turn on
what was printed using the taxed products. Finally, by restricting
the tax to mass publications, the tax undoubtedly ended up primari-
ly restricting speech relevant to democratic self-governance, because
surely most, if not all, speech published in newspapers and similar
mass-circulation publications constitutes core, protected speech.
These factors demonstrate that this was a genuinely difficult case—
as illustrated by the fact that the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld
the tax, only to be reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court,188 accompa-
nied by a dissent189 and a partial dissent.190 Ultimately, however, the
Court probably was correct to invalidate the tax. The fundamental
problem with Minnesota’s position, as the majority opinion empha-
sizes, was that the state simply could not identify a strong, plausible
government interest in enacting a tax singling out speech produc-
tion by the press.191 Minnesota’s revenue-raising goals could instead
have been easily achieved by subjecting publications to the gener-
ally applicable sales tax, which the Court emphasized would have
been perfectly constitutional,192 and would be under my analysis as
well because it is a permissible generally applicable regulation.
Given the lack of a strong governmental interest, a fortiori, the
burden on speech outweighs the state interest.
187. See supra Part I.A.
188. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 579 (1983).
189. Id. at 596-604 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 593-96 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191. Id. at 586-88 (majority opinion).
192. Id. at 586 n.9.
1068 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1029
B. Recording Public Officials
My analysis suggests that decisions striking down eavesdropping
laws as applied to recording public officials in public places, such as
Alvarez and Glik,193 are also correct, both in protecting the conduct
at issue but also in limiting the holdings to recording public officials.
Eavesdropping statutes are clearly regulations on speech produc-
tion, because recordings are undoubtedly speech when played
back.194 On the other hand, because such statutes typically require
consent to record any conversation, regardless of the subject matter
of the conversation or the identity of the participants,195 such stat-
utes are also quite clearly content-neutral. Thus, when applied to
speech that is not relevant to democratic self-governance—for exam-
ple, the recording of conversations on truly private matters—such
laws are permissible.
When the statute is applied to speech that is highly relevant to
democracy, such as recording public officials in public places, the
balance shifts dramatically. For one thing, as the Seventh Circuit
pointed out, the usual justification for eavesdropping laws, the pro-
tection of privacy, has little or no relevance to this situation,
because by definition the conversations being recorded are audible
to the public, and the recordings are made openly.196 Beyond this,
police officers clearly have no legitimate interest in preventing re-
cordings from being made that provide the public with objective in-
formation about how the officers go about their jobs. As such, we are
left with weak or no governmental interests supporting application
193. See supra Part I.B.
194. One might imagine a narrow class of secret recordings, created for example by Peeping
Toms, which are never intended to be shared with an audience, and thus, they might not
constitute speech. However, the vast, vast majority of recordings are of course created for the
express purpose of being played back to others, and so the overwhelming impact of a
restriction on recording is to restrict speech production. It would therefore be highly
disingenuous to characterize such a law as a generally applicable conduct regulation.
195. As noted earlier, a provision in the Illinois statute struck down in Alvarez adding a
penalty enhancement for recording public officials probably does qualify as a content-based
restriction. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. However, the Alvarez court declined to
consider that provision because the ACLU was seeking an injunction against the statute as
a whole, not the penalty enhancement. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 604 n.11 (7th
Cir. 2012).
196. Id. at 605-06. This is also the reason why the Illinois Supreme Court found the same
statute to be overbroad. See People v. Clark, 6 N.E.3d 154, 161-62 (Ill. 2014).
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of a law that, in this situation, prevents the production of highly
socially valuable speech, and thus pushes the balance obviously in
favor of speech. Furthermore, this reasoning seems to extend to
most situations involving public officials acting in public places,
suggesting that the Third Circuit was wrong in Whiteland Woods to
uphold a ban on recording a planning commission meeting.197
Two caveats are necessary here, however. First, there may be spe-
cific instances where the government does have a special regulatory
interest in prohibiting recordings even of public events. In this case
a prohibition may be justifiable. Cameras in the courtroom come to
mind as a possible example. Second, nothing here suggests any bar-
rier to the adoption of narrowly tailored rules regulating recordings
in such a way as to ensure that there is no physical interference
with, for example, police work. However, tailoring and factual
justification are important here, suggesting that the Third Circuit’s
blanket assumption that a ban on recording traffic stops would be
permissible probably goes too far.198
Finally, the analysis above also points the way to how the
decisions in Alvarez and related cases can be reconciled with the
Supreme Court’s assumption in the Bartnicki decision that a ban on
using an illegal wiretap to record a conversation on a matter of
public concern was permissible.199 In both Alvarez and Bartnicki, the
impact of the law was to prohibit the creation of a recording, the
content of which was highly relevant to politics. Furthermore, in
both cases, the law at issue was content-neutral. The difference,
however, is that the government’s interest in prohibiting electronic
wiretaps is far stronger than its interest in prohibiting the recording
of public conversations. Such wiretaps directly intrude on private
conversations—in Bartnicki, the wiretap was of a cell phone
conversation200—in a way that recording public conversations does
not. Furthermore, in a legitimate attempt to protect privacy, the
government has a clear and strong regulatory interest in prohibiting
all wiretaps. Put differently, it is hard to see how an exemption from
wiretap laws for intercepting conversations “on matters of public
197. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (discussing Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle,
622 F.3d 248, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2010)).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 178-83.
200. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518-19 (2001).
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concern” would be manageable. Given these factors, flat prohibitions
on surreptitious wiretaps are almost certainly permissible, even as
applied to the creation of recordings containing materials relevant
to self-governance.201
C. Bareback Pornography
Los Angeles County’s ban on bareback pornography, Measure
B,202 poses a much more difficult problem than the eavesdropping
and wiretapping statutes discussed above. Like those statutes, Mea-
sure B clearly targets the production of speech. As noted earlier, the
law forbids only the filming of sex without condoms; it does not reg-
ulate use of condoms more generally.203 Measure B is also content-
based, because it prevents the creation of specific content—video
recordings of sex without condoms. However, it is equally clear that
the government interest motivating Measure B, controlling the
spread of STDs among actors, is not related to the communicative
impact of the speech being suppressed.204 Thus, under my proposed
approach, the proper analysis for this law is some form of intermedi-
ate scrutiny, with special attention to whether the law completely
suppresses specific content because the government interest here
obviously is powerful.
Also, unlike in Minneapolis Star & Tribune, there are good rea-
sons why the legislation singles out the production of speech. The-
oretically, the best way to prevent the spread of STDs is to mandate
the use of condoms for all sex, or perhaps for all promiscuous sex.
However, that is obviously not plausible and probably unconsti-
tutional.205 Furthermore, the creation of pornography is distinguish
201. One complication here is that even though privacy interests are invaded by any secret
wiretaps, the intrusion on privacy is substantially increased if the recording is later broadcas-
ted to an audience. In other words, the government’s interest in protecting privacy is partially
independent of communicative impact, but partially not. This may be why in Bartnicki, the
Court presumed the constitutionality of forbidding the initial wiretap, but struck down an
effort to punish a subsequent broadcast of the taped conversation. See id. at 525, 535.
202. See supra Part I.C.
203. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
204. Note that if the intent behind Measure B was not to protect actors but rather to pre-
vent the creation of films that glorify unprotected sex, then the government interest would
be directly linked to communicative impact, and Measure B would be presumptively unconsti-
tutional.
205. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); supra note 168 (citing Eisenstadt
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able from other sex because it is necessarily promiscuous, and it is
commercialized sex. This matters because commercialization makes
regulation both easier and more appropriate, and because it would
be rather difficult to identify and regulate noncommercial promiscu-
ous sex. Note that if prostitution were legal in California, Measure
B would be more suspect if it did not require the use of condoms in
prostitution, as Nevada does.206 But since it is not, there is no under-
inclusiveness.
The more difficult questions posed by Measure B are whether it
is truly necessary to prevent the spread of STDs, and whether it
completely eliminates particular content—in the argot of intermedi-
ate scrutiny, whether it “leave[s] open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information.”207 In Vivid Entertainment,
the plaintiffs argued that Measure B was not necessary because the
existing system of universal testing in the adult film industry effec-
tively prevented the spread of STDs.208 The district court accepted
this argument for the purpose of denying defendants’ motion to
dismiss,209 but rejected it for the purpose of denying a preliminary
injunction.210 The question of whether Measure B is truly necessary
to achieve the government’s regulatory goals is thus open to dispute.
As for alternative channels, Alexander Birkhold argues that
Measure B fails this test because it eliminates any outlet for
expressing the message associated with bareback, especially gay
bareback pornography.211 That conclusion, however, is also open to
dispute. For one thing, as Birkhold acknowledges, Measure B leaves
open the option of using a condom during filming, but then using
digital technology to eliminate it.212 He argues that this option is
inadequate because of the costs associated with the technology and
because if viewers know a condom was used during filming, the
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
206. Barbara G. Brents & Kathryn Hausbeck, State-Sanctioned Sex: Negotiating Formal
and Informal Regulatory Practices in Nevada Brothels, 44 SOC. PERSP. 307, 314 (2001).
207. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
208. Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
209. Id. at 1126-27.
210. Id. at 1135.
211. Birkhold, supra note 25, at 1823-24.
212. Id. at 1824.
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message is watered down.213 Given the government’s strong interest
here, however, the cost argument is not altogether convincing, espe-
cially because, presumably, many commercial studios could bear the
cost. And as for the watering-down argument, this is based on the
proposition that viewers will know how the film was made, which is
far from clear. It also remains true that because Measure B applies
only in Los Angeles County, in practice it does not eliminate bare-
back pornography.214 This last argument, however, strikes me as
dubious, because if other jurisdictions adopt similar measures, the
effect would be to eliminate true (as opposed to digital) bareback
pornography.
Measure B thus poses a genuinely difficult problem. It is sup-
ported by strong government interests and is well tailored, both
weighing in favor of its validity. On the other hand, its necessity is
subject to dispute and its impact on a particular category of speech
production is significant. On the whole, however, I am inclined to
think that because of the strength of the government’s interest in
controlling STDs, and because the industry retains the option of
creating digital bareback pornography, Measure B should be upheld.
D. Tattooing
Like Measure B, regulation of tattooing requires a fairly nuanced
First Amendment analysis. There can be little doubt that the cre-
ation of a tattoo is normally the production of speech. Many tattoos
communicate specific messages through words or symbols, which
would of course be fully protected speech. And even with respect to
purely pictorial tattoos, if the First Amendment protects traditional
pictorial art such as oil paintings, there seems no logical reason why
a tattoo would not be equally protected. Of course, the content of
many, if not most, tattoos are not relevant to democratic govern-
ment, but some tattoos undoubtedly have sufficient political or
cultural content to justify protection. On the other hand, most
213. Id.
214. See Susan Abram, One Year Later, Condom-in-Porn Law Reshapes Industry in L.A.
County, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 4, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.dailynews.com/social-affairs/
20131104/one-year-later-condoms-in-porn-law-reshapes-industry-in-la-county [http://perma.cc/
8HE6-AVA3] (indicating that since the adoption of Measure B, most of the pornographic
industry has moved production outside Los Angeles).
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regulations of tattoo parlors—such as licensing, inspection, and
health rules—are content-neutral and not motivated by hostility to
messages conveyed by tattoos. Rather, they are driven by entirely
legitimate concerns such as public health or safeguarding minors.
Therefore, although such regulations are, under my analysis, sub-
ject to some scrutiny, they would generally be easily upheld even if
they impose costs on the creation of tattoos on topics of public con-
cern, unless they impose substantially excessive and unnecessary
costs.
Much more problematic are complete bans on operating tattoo
parlors, such as the ban struck down in Anderson v. City of Hermosa
Beach.215 Such bans are on their face content-neutral. In Anderson,
the court analyzed the ban as such.216 But even on this issue, a ques-
tion might be raised about precisely why a jurisdiction might choose
to ban tattoo parlors. Many of the possible reasons—primarily
health concerns and concerns about access by minors—are certainly
content-neutral. But insofar as part of the motivation is connected
to the (allegedly) counter-culture connotations of tattoos, that may
well be an interest somewhat related to specific messages. In all
probability, most courts could follow the lead of the Anderson court
in treating flat bans as content-neutral, given the difficulty of
proving bad motive and the Supreme Court’s ambiguity regarding
whether such an inquiry into motive is appropriate.217 But the
question remains open to dispute.
Moreover, even if flat bans are analyzed as content-neutral, their
validity is doubtful. Under my proposed analytic framework,
content-neutral regulation of tattooing poses constitutional concerns
only as applied to speech relevant to self-governance. However,
some tattoos do send cultural or political messages, and so are pro-
tected, and a flat ban by definition prevents their creation. As such,
these bans are subject to constitutional scrutiny. Once scrutiny is
conceded, however, such bans are hard to justify. As the Anderson
court pointed out, given the possibility of adopting targeted health
regulations, it is hard to see how a flat ban on tattoo parlors is
215. 621 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 2010).
216. Id. at 1064.
217. Compare Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 811-12 (1985)
(authorizing an inquiry into administrative motivation), with United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 382-86 (1968) (rejecting propriety of inquiries into legislative motive).
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necessary to achieve the government’s regulatory objectives.218
Moreover, a ban on tattooing has a substantial impact on speech by
completely eliminating a distinctive and, to some speakers, uniquely
personal means of communication.219 Given the weakness of the
government’s interest in banning tattoo parlors altogether and the
substantial impact on speech, the constitutional balance would seem
to tilt against such laws.
E. Ag-Gag
If Measure B and regulations of tattooing pose difficult problems,
analysis of Utah’s Ag-Gag legislation is much more straightforward.
Most of the law (except for subsection (b)) explicitly regulates mak-
ing recordings of agricultural operations.220 These subsections thus
directly restrict producing speech. Subsection (b) admittedly does
not directly target speech; it rather prohibits gaining access to an
agricultural operation on false pretenses.221 However, insofar as this
provision is likely to be invoked only against animal-rights activists
seeking to make recordings, it is likely to be directed at producing
speech in practice, even if not on its face. Furthermore, Ag-Gag laws
are clearly content-based. They prohibit the creation of specific
content: recordings of agricultural operations. Finally, the only
plausible purpose behind Ag-Gag laws is to protect sales by
preserving the goodwill and business reputations of owners of agri-
cultural operations. However, these interests are directly tied to
communicative impact, because agricultural operators’ good will and
reputations will only be affected if members of the public are
offended or repulsed after viewing the recordings of agricultural
operations. Therefore, strict scrutiny should apply to such laws, and
is likely to be fatal.222 Needless to say, Utah’s interest in protecting
the sales and reputations of agribusiness, even if legitimate (which
218. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1065.
219. See id. at 1065-67; cf. City of LaDue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54-55 (1994) (striking down
ban on residential signs, partly on the grounds that such signs are a distinct and personal
medium of communication).
220. See supra text accompanying note 112-13.
221. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (West 2012).
222. See supra note 176 (noting that a majority of the Supreme Court has upheld only one
law under strict scrutiny in a free speech case, and that case involved national security).
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is doubtful), certainly does not rise to the level of a compelling inter-
est sufficient to justify censorship.
F. Photography
The regulations of photography discussed in Part I raise perhaps
the most difficult analytic issues of all of the restrictions on speech
production that we have discussed.223 With respect to limits on
Google’s image capture, the problem is complex. On the one hand,
such laws at first appear to be content-neutral restrictions on
producing speech—akin to time, place, and manner regulations of
speech. But that analogy is deceptive. Insofar as restrictions on
image capture are designed to protect privacy, they will typically be
written to prohibit image capture in particular places, such as resi-
dential neighborhoods. But such a law is in effect a ban on taking
pictures of homes, which is not content-neutral because it singles
out specific content (pictures of homes). On the other hand, a
privacy law that requires consent before a photograph is taken is
probably best understood as content-neutral. Thus, whether the law
is content-based will depend heavily on the exact nature of the
restriction.
Another difficult question is the value of the speech created by
Google. At least some of that speech, by imparting important in-
formation to the public regarding geography, is at least marginally
relevant to democratic self-governance. Furthermore, regulations on
image capture have the potential to substantially restrict Google’s
ability to capture the data needed for Google Maps and Google
Earth. These factors, in combination, argue against the permis-
sibility of regulation. Realistically, however, much of the speech at
issue here—driving directions, street views, et cetera—have little
real relevance to self-governance. Rather, this speech appears to be
commercial services provided by Google.
There are thus real questions about both the value of the speech,
and the level of scrutiny that restrictions on Google’s image capture
should receive. The analysis is further complicated by the fact that
the privacy concerns raised by Google’s image capture are quite
substantial, because they involve photographs, often of private
223. See supra Part I.F.
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residences, taken without consent.224 In short, regulation of Google’s
image capture involves a situation in which there are strong inter-
ests on both sides, and scrutiny is significant but probably not high-
ly searching, so long as the relevant restriction is written in content-
neutral terms.225 How to resolve such cases tends to confound judges
because it requires the weighing of incommensurate values—speech
versus privacy—with no particular presumption either way.
The facts of Elane Photography pose a similarly difficult problem,
though for different reasons. Recall that in Elane Photography, the
New Mexico Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge
to the application of an antidiscrimination law against a commercial
wedding photographer who declined to photograph a same-sex
commitment ceremony.226 The court concluded that Elane Photogra-
phy’s rights were not violated because the impact of the
antidiscrimination statute was simply to prohibit discrimination in
choice of clients, not to compel Elane Photography to create speech
of which it disapproved.227 In effect, the court treated the antidis-
crimination statute as a generally applicable regulation of conduct.
In the course of doing so, the court emphasized that New Mexico law
“does not, nor could it, regulate the content of the photographs that
Elane Photography produces,”228 and that “[t]he government has not
interfered with Elane Photography’s editorial judgment; the only
choice regulated is Elane Photography’s choice of clients.”229 If the
court’s analysis is correct, the result is a fortiori correct as well.
But the issue is more difficult than the court acknowledged. For
most businesses, prohibiting discrimination would not interfere with
their speech, or production of speech.230 When, however, such a law
224. For example, the street view of my house on Google Maps provides (admittedly blurry)
glimpses into my living room and bedroom.
225. If a restriction is found to be content-based, the problem becomes more substantial,
especially because privacy concerns are directly linked to the communicative impact of the
eventual speech. The Supreme Court’s current speech doctrine suggests that such restrictions
may not be enforced if the resultant speech is of public concern, but probably can be enforced
against purely private speech. See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broad.
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
226. Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 64, 66-68 (N.M. 2013).
227. Id. at 66-68.
228. Id. at 66.
229. Id. at 67.
230. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 490 (1993) (concluding that a statute impos-
ing a penalty enhancement on criminals who select their victims based on race or other
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is imposed on a business that sells photographs (or for that matter,
video recordings, oil paintings, or any other depictions) of clients,
restricting the business’s choice of clients restricts what speech it
may produce. In this situation, New Mexico is not restricting Elane
Photography’s choice of clients; it is forcing the firm to serve partic-
ular clients that it does not want to serve. However, the direct,
predictable, and indeed desired impact of that action is to force
Elane Photography to produce photographs of a same-sex ceremony,
which it prefers not to do. That certainly looks like compelled pro-
duction of speech of a particular content and interference with
editorial judgment.
What makes Elane Photography such a difficult case is that both
characterizations of the law—as a generally applicable regulation
of conduct, or as a law compelling production of particular con-
tent—are justifiable on the facts. The question posed is whether a
law which, as applied, directly and necessarily compels speech
production of specific content, but on its face and in most applica-
tions has nothing to do with speech, should be subject to serious
scrutiny. Put differently, the question is whether the First Amend-
ment compels excusing purely creative or expressive businesses
from a generally applicable law that has the practical effect of regu-
lating its speech-producing activities. The New Mexico court simply
asserted that the answer was “no,” relying on cases that raised quite
different questions.231 Yet, that conclusion is far from obvious.
Ultimately, however, I do think the court’s conclusion was
probably correct, at least as applied to commercial businesses.232
Antidiscrimination statutes do not, on their face or by intent, sup-
press speech or target the production of speech. Almost all of their
applications raise essentially no First Amendment issues. The fact
that they may affect the content of speech in some applications does
not change the fact that they are, at heart, regulations of conduct.
Put differently, even though for Elane Photography, the choice of
clients is the choice of content, for analytic purposes it seems better
to treat them as distinct things. It should be added that this
protected classifications did not burden free speech rights).
231. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 71-73.
232. Application of antidiscrimination law to noncommercial associations raises serious
constitutional problems, which the Court has recognized. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (2000).
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approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Cohen
v. Cowles Media.233 There, the Court upheld liability based on prom-
issory estoppel against a media defendant, even though the act that
triggered the liability was publication of specific information.234
Similarly, in Elane Photography, I would argue that the fact that
application of antidiscrimination law ends up compelling the
production of particular speech should not change our characteriza-
tion of the law as one of general applicability. It must be conceded,
however, that this is a very close issue on which precedent is largely
lacking—and indeed, on which the Cohen Court divided five to
four.235
G. The Right to Gather Information
Finally, what about the purported right to gather information?236
To what extent does the above analysis provide support for such a
right? The answer, I think, is that it does not. For reasons discussed
above, there are sound grounds to conclude that the First Amend-
ment should be understood to provide some protection for the actual
production of speech. The Press Clause provides textual and histor-
ical support for such a right, and in any event, the production of
speech, like the distribution of speech, is so closely connected to acts
of communication that penumbral protection seems necessary. The
same simply cannot be said of gathering information. For one thing,
as noted earlier, the causal and temporal connection between gath-
ering information and speech is more distant than the connection
between producing speech and actual speech.237 More fundamen-
tally, unlike speech production, information gathering often has no
connection to speech at all. Admittedly, much speech requires
information, and when the institutional media or other professional
speakers gather information, it is generally to produce speech. For
much of the population, however, information gathering may be an
end in itself, a matter of self-education, with no plan to use the
233. See 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
234. Id. at 670-71; cf. id. at 675-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that because liabili-
ty was triggered by publication, the case did not involve generally applicable regulations).
235. See id. at 665, 672, 676.
236. See supra Part I.G.
237. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
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information to create speech. Of course, open government is gener-
ally desirable, and government efforts to withhold information from
citizens are problematic under democratic theory. But it is hard to
come up with a strong argument that the First Amendment requires
open government, especially if one accepts, as I believe one must,
the technology reading of the Press Clause.
One might imagine a counterargument that some access to
information is essential if the speech and press rights are to have
meaning.238 The problem is that there are many things that are
necessary for meaningful communication that the First Amendment
does not protect. For example, in campaign finance cases, the Su-
preme Court has held that spending money is protected by the First
Amendment, because spending money is essential to speaking
effectively.239 No one, however, believes that this undeniable fact
creates a right to government funding for one’s speech.240 Indeed, a
right to gather information has much in common with a subsidy, in
that the government will rarely be able to provide information to
citizens without incurring costs. Similarly, some forms of speech
require paper, but surely that does not mean that the government
must permit public forests to be logged to create that paper.
Fundamentally, what remains true is that although the First
Amendment prohibits the government from suppressing speech and
speech production, it does not require the government to enable the
creation of speech. A right to gather information is more akin to the
latter than to the former.
Though I reject a broad right to gather information, there is one
situation in which government interference with information
gathering might raise a First Amendment issue. If the government
generally provides the public with access to information, but then
tries to block access to those who would use the information to
create speech, for instance those who would record and disseminate
that information, that action seems more like a restriction on speech
creation than a restriction on information, because the actual target
of such a law is the creation of speech. Such selective restrictions on
238. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 3, at 313-20, 347-48.
239. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339-40 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19
(1976).
240. Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-200 (1991) (holding that when the government
subsidizes speech, it may select what content or viewpoint it wishes to subsidize).
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access, therefore, do raise First Amendment concerns. The most
obvious example of such a restriction would be if the public gener-
ally was allowed access to an event, but members of the press were
selectively excluded. This principle, however, is not limited to
discrimination against the press, whomever that is, because the
Press Clause does not favor any particular group of speakers. Any
rule crafted to exclude potential speakers is suspect. Indeed, it is
hard to envision any legitimate reason, unrelated to the communica-
tive impact of speech, why the government would create such a
selective exclusion. Such exclusions thus should be presumed to be
unconstitutional—though I do not exclude the possibility that under
unusual circumstances, such as the exclusion of cameras from
courtrooms, a noncommunicative government interest sufficient to
justify selective exclusion, might exist.
It should be noted that the conclusions I have reached regarding
information gathering essentially reflect the current state of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. As noted earlier, the Court has
consistently rejected a right to gather information for either the
institutional press, or the public generally.241 However, all of the
cases have involved generally applicable laws restricting access to
information, not selective restrictions. If the Court did face a selec-
tive restriction, I am confident that it would be as suspicious of such
a law as it was of the selective tax struck down in Minneapolis Star
& Tribune. In short, this is one area where the Court appears to
have gotten it right.
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment does not only protect speech, meaning an
act of communication. It also protects the creation of communicative
materials—in other words, producing speech. The Press Clause of
the First Amendment provides a strong textual basis for such pro-
tection, because what the Press Clause protects—the printing
press—is and was a technology used for the creation of speech
meant for mass dissemination. Unlike pure communication, howev-
er, the production of speech entails conduct, and often conduct with
negative social consequences. As a result, while some protection for
241. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
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producing speech is essential, that protection cannot be as extensive
as the protection accorded to communication itself. The objective of
this Article has been to develop and defend the principle that the
First Amendment protects speech production, and to propose a
doctrinal framework to implement that protection.
The larger question raised by my analysis is the extent to which
constitutional provisions generally, and the First Amendment in
particular, should be understood to extend beyond their literal text
and to create penumbral principles which are necessary to make the
central constitutional protections meaningful. Justice Douglas pro-
posed such an approach in Griswold v. Connecticut, but then gave
it a bad name by adopting an unmoored and excessive understand-
ing of what penumbral protection might look like.242 The analysis
presented here suggests, however, that even if we reject the
reasoning of the Griswold majority, we should not reject penumbras
altogether. It is possible to envision penumbral principles that are
truly tied to constitutional text and that do not entail either unlim-
ited rights or unlimited judicial discretion. What remains to be
considered is what sorts of penumbras emanate from parts of the
First Amendment other than the Speech and Press Clauses, or from
the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment more generally.
242. 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965).
       
